Where Words Can Be Set Free

Anantanand Rambachan, “Where Words Can Be Set Free: The Liberating Potency of Vedic Words in the Hermeneutics of Śaṅkara” in Texts in Context, ed. Jeffrey Timm, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1997, 33-46.

 Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa claimed that the Upaniṣads did not have an independent purpose. Śaṅkara on the other hand felt that the Upaniṣads were an integral part of the Vedas. (33)

Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa contend that the knowledge of dharma and adharma cannot be acquired from any source outside of the Vedas, while knowledge of other existents, including Brahman could be sought and found elsewhere. In this way, they ensured the elevated status of the Veda and made all other literature subservient to it. (34)

Śaṅkara agrees with the Mīmāṁsa contention on the knowledge available in the Vedas but felt they were doing injustice to the Brahman. According to him, the two categories of knowledge that are inaccessible to all other pramaṇas (sources of knowledge) and attainable only through the Vedas are dharma and Brahman (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya 2.1.6). Both of them are suprasensible realities and hence lie beyond the reach of ordinary sense. Śaṅkara notes that the first part of the Vedas give knowledge of dharma (ritual actions and moral practices) which can be termed collectively as karmakāṇḍa (path of action), while the latter part of the Vedas reveal Brahman and hence can be termed, jñānakaṇḍa (path of knowledge).

He goes on to provide two reasons why Brahman is beyond sense knowledge: 1) Every existent is the object of a pramaṇa. There must be an appropriate relation between the pramaṇa and its object like the ear and sound. But Brahman is an existent with a unique nirguṇa (attributeless) nature and hence cannot be known by any pramaṇa.

2) The process of empirical knowledge involves a distinction between the subject and object, knower and known. Knowledge presupposes a subject – there must be someone who knows, but Brahman is the eternal subject. As awareness (caitanya) it illumines everything even the mind, body and sense organs. Thus, the knower cannot itself be made the object to be known. Neither can we say that Brahman is both subject and object since it results in a contradiction. (35-36)

Brahman is not an absolute other, an unknown. Śaṅkara writes, “The existence of brahman is well known from the fact of Its being the Self of all; for everyone feels that his Self exists and he never feels, “I do not exist.” Had there been no general recognition of the existence of the Self, everyone would have felt, “I do not exist.” And that Self is Brahman. (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya 1.1.1) Such knowledge of Brahman is only sāmānya jñāna (general knowledge) and not viśeṣa jñāna (specific knowledge), thus allowing for mistakes and superimpositions through avidyā (ignorance) to occur. For this reason, one can speak of Brahman as if it possesses this or that quality when all the while, Brahman is nirguṇa. In this context, the function of the words of the Upaniṣads is a help to remove or negate the attributes that are falsely imposed on Brahman. They help one realize the truth about Brahman. They lead one beyond the words, beyond the false attributes that are accorded to Brahman to the true nature of Brahman. (40)

 

In order to discover the true meaning of any scriptural passage, Advaita Vedānta uses the sixfold criteria (ṣaḍliṅga) formulated by  Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa exegetes:

        i.            Upakramopasaṁhāra (the beginning and the end) – If the subject matter at the beginning and end of a text are coherent and congruous with each other, then the texts meaning is more evident.

      ii.            Abhyāsa (repetition) – If themes are repeated throughout the text then it is obvious that they are important to the text.

    iii.            Apūrva (novelty) – If the subject matter of the text can be verified by other pramaṇas or by experience then something is amiss. The Vedas are supposed to provide knowledge of things that are beyond human experience and for this reason they must be valued, respected and followed. However, suppose they provide information of something worldly and that proves to be incorrect, it doesn’t reflect well on the text. This could also be extended to mean that one ought to take as scriptural valid only those parts that go beyond our experience.

    iv.            Phala (fruit) – The purport of a passage is also indicated by the clear mention of an independent result. This means that if a particular passage mentions its own independent result, then it cannot be taken to be just another part of a larger text but must be considered in its own right.

      v.            Arthavāda (commendation) This refers to the praise of the subject matter in the course of the discussion. Occasionally, in the Upaniṣads one finds statements that glorify the knowledge available in them. These are precise examples of arthavāda.

    vi.            Upapatti (demonstration) – Usage of arguments to clarify and establish the reasonableness of the subject matter. (41-42)

Advaita holds that through the application of ṣaḍliṅga, it can show that the sentences of the Upaniṣads are not inferior to other texts but have an independent significance in revealing Brahman. (42)